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The icon is the same as the prototype.
However, it is different from it.
Gregory of Nyssa
Dum silet, clamat, et dum clamat, silet;
et invisibilis videtur, et du videtur, invisbilis est.
John Scotus Erigena, De Divisione Naturae, Ill, 4
Distance, difference
The critique of distance as a purely rhetorical and by no means conceptual theme, how-
ever pertinent it may be, lacks two characteristics which have determined our remarks
from the beginning. First, distance has a definition. Secondly, it is by definition undefin-
able. Distance can be defined through a variety of equivalent statements. To use an
example among others: only alterity allows for communion and no distinction separates
without in the very same moment uniting more fully. Another example: the possibility
of intimacy between God and man is rendered only by incommensurability because only
withdrawal enables the Father, just as the paternal withdrawal contrives for man the
sumptuous freedom of a son. And finally: that which makes "God" accessible, either to
legitimate or delegitimate him, offers but the idol of the spectator and confuses itself
with him in a phantasmatic identification. Thus distance as di-stance indicates that only
duality allows recognition, and communion advances to the same degree as does the
gap across which gazes are exchanged. Di-stance: that which becomes related to me
always and forever issues from me and my doubles. Only he who stands before me is
with me.
The struggle with the angel is not to be equated with communion (as the negative
presumes), nor does it contradict communion (as supposed by an indistinct harmony),
but it prepares the benediction which fulfills it. Distance buttresses both until they are
blessed. Moreover, if I am the one, the other here is God; I only render to God a bene-
diction after I have struggled to the degree that I understand that this very struggle was
a blessing for me. God's blessing is in making me face up to Him; struggle here finds its
truth in creation. The greater the gap facing the distanced one, the greater the distance
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blesses. Distance can therefore display its own radicalness to the very point of a defi-
nition. In order to achieve definition, it must be recognized as undefinable, or rather, as
undefined. For it creates an indefinite series of definitions which connect to one another
without a closure ever being able to exhaust the subject. Neither a discursive subject
nor the object of a science, distance, by definition, removes itself from definition. In-
deed, it only assures the communion of terms that it itself has isolated. Of these terms,
one is of immediate interest to us now, we who are speaking here. As for the other
term, we can only approach it through a communion that the gap traverses the more it
is a question of distance. The definition of distance itself defines us as one of its terms,
and therefore repels us from the other at the very moment its attraction asserts itself.
The other, intimately a stranger, disappears into its own apparition and defines itself by
the indefinite. The unthinkable is neither given nor matched by any image, any concept,
or by any denial of an image or a concept. A radical approach to distance itself means
that one of its terms remains radically unapproachable. Such is the case to the extent
that distance itself offers itself in its most defined radicalness. Thus we could speak of
an asymmetry of distance: its definition involves two poles, or rather, it calls them forth
and supports them. But this definition is expressed from only one of those poles - ours,
the one that is in human terms defined and finite. The communicating gap causes the
other part to be marked by indefiniteness, an indefiniteness which precisely designates
the intimate alterity of its terms within distance. There is no third pole, dull and neutral
(Levinas) which can offer itself to speak fairly of distance. Furthermore, supposing such
a pole does present itself, a pole which such and such thinking hastily done in represen-
tational terms will not fail to propose, it is not distance that would be thought through
such a pole. This is because distance only opens the communicating gap from one of the
terms to be found in it, or rather, from one of the terms that finds its own horizon in it:
distance is discovered only like a path is blazed, beginning from a site, but not like
reading an itinerary on a map, in the "anyplace" of a neutralized representation. Because
it displays its radical definition, distance therefore reinscribes this definition into one of
its terms, subjecting it to its perspective and plunging it entirely into its constitutive
asymmetry. By definition, the definition is subjected to that which is defined by it: the
definition is still comprehended in distance itself; the definition is expressed only within
the intimate act of listening that it illustrates and which places it in perspective from a
particular site. Even in its most radical definition, distance allows itself to be repre-
sented only if representation itself is introduced into the asymmetry of distance.
Radical is the di-stance that no representation can layout. Its definition becomes an
awakening echo, that twin characteristic of distance itself. An echo of ontological dif-
ference that Heidegger was given to approaching. It seems inevitable to pose a crucial
question - doesn't distance itself, essentially and with only with a few additions (to be
specified later) amount to ontological difference? Distance as di-stance only stresses the
gap in order to cultivate its intimacy. Whereas ontological difference distinguishes
between beings caught in their unavoidable and weighty factualness, Being, far from
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being confounded with one being or an other, governs, cultivates and unveils each
being. Without giving itself to be seen like a being, being reveals itself in the most trivial
evidence, and by this is able to obsess us with its evident presence, its present evidence
- Being itself. Being and beings only become evident through difference, a difference
where the beings in their brute facticity allow the "nothingness" of Being to be discov-
ered in them without which, however, they would not themselves be open to discovery.
Beings are all the more manifested by difference since difference condenses a being's
ontological aura; difference foreshadows a being all the more by consigning it to ontic
"nothingness." The ontic and the ontological are harmoniously differentiated by differ-
ence. "Being in the sense of revealing enthrallment and being as such in the sense of
refuge-seeking encounter have their being as elements that have been differentiated
from the Same, that which underlies difference (Unter-Schied). What underlies dis-
tinction is what is originally responsible for yielding and keeping apart the between,
wherein enthrallment and encounter are conjoined and mutually supported in their fluc-
tuating relationship. The difference of Being and being as the ground of distinction
(Unter-Schied) between enthrallment and encounter lies in the unmasking-enshrouding
(entbergend-bergende Austrag) issue of both." 1 Difference does not signal an antago-
nism between Being and beings so much as it definitely deepens the irreducible double-
ness of their Fold (Zwiefalt) in order to affect a more intimate resolution. Differ-ence: a
spanning which passes from one part to the next like a bridge's arch spans pylons. Aus-
trag: tragen here simply replaces the fit so that the play of spanning goes beyond a dual
(di-) exteriority (Aus-). The ground of difference rests less on antagonism than on an
equilibrium of forces. Distance maintains the duality (di-) of masses of matter by throw-
ing one against the other in order to arrest, in the middle of the sky and in a buttressing
and immobilising shock, their respective falls (-stance). In the exposure of ontological
difference as a re-port (Aus-trag, differ-ence) which most fundamentally resolves Being
and beings rather than polemically opposes them, we find the communion that is ulti-
mately the aim of distance. It must also be clearly noted that difference resolves Being
and beings and that these do not correspond to God, man and Father-son of distance
itself. To the extent that the relation distance-difference is composed of terms unlikely
to be identified with each other, does not their correspondence become all the more
strangely familiar? Moreover, to speak of "relations" in relation to distance appears
as incongruous as to speak of them in relation to difference, for both, one and the
other, still serve and they alone serve the purpose of making possible and thinkable all
relations, oppositions and correspondence - from their original resolutions (report,
di-stance, Aus-trag). Does distance provide a resolution in the same manner as onto-
logical difference?
Distance is defined, as we have seen, only by exempting it from any definition claim-
ing to secure a neutral intelligibility and to represent distance as an attainable object.
For ontological difference challenges a clear and distinct representation of its stake and
its play. As to its stake: the difference between Being and beings does not offer itself to
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be conceived uniformly. In it, a being can give an object to be known, an object which
thus finds support in a tangible material that is available, in a word, comprehensible.
Ontic being sustains representation. Being, on the other hand, "is" not in the sense that
beings are; it surrounds beings with the nimbus of an invisible light which no prism can
decompose into elementary colours which are as visible as is a being; Being - the pure
nothingness of beings2 - never ceases to disappear so long as beings appear; beings
themselves only appear as long as this ability is dispensed to them by the withdrawal of
Being. Being never appears except in the withdrawal which renders (in)visible being vis-
ible. In its asymmetry, difference resolves the obsessive advance of a being with the
accommodating withdrawal of Being, thus resolves the irrepresentable and the repre-
sentable. "We speak of the difference between Being and beings. The "step back" starts
from what has not yet been thought, difference as such. What is to be thought is the
status of difference. The forgetfulness which must here be thought is the veiling of dif-
ference as such, a veiling that is pondered starting from occlusion, lethe, an occlusion
which, for its part, has withdrawn itself from the very beginning. Forgetting belongs to
difference because the former comes back to the latter. It is not as if forgetting comes
belatedly to obscure difference simply because human thinking would be forgetful."3
Forgetting is not the result of some inadvertent psychological process, even less of some
collective failing: it stems from the very constitution of ontological difference which
only stages Being from the perspective of a being, as the irrepresentable Being of a rep-
resentable being. For as the lecture What is Metaphysics? indicates, Being only appears
when Nothingness shows itself without appearance or visibility. Indeed, supposing pres-
ence is a privileged temporality of Being, it falls to a being to concentrate presence in
itself without, however, Being ever conforming its "to be" to this presence. Forgetting
thus does not add itself to ontological difference but constitutes its obverse: the fateful
decision to think Being as Being of a being provokes the forgetting of difference, since
difference fundamentally already managed the forgetting of Being. Forgetting is the
stake of ontological difference and as a fateful stake it strips difference of all represen-
tation, since representation, at least understood in the rigour of its modern essence, far
from compensating for this forgetting or even conceptualizing it, springs from this for-
getting. As for distance, it analogically displays its stake in the alternatives of misrecog-
nition and recognition. In insuring intimacy at the price of maintaining a gap, distance
always risks being swallowed up in simple absence, possibly leading to the triviality of a
(non-Nietzschean, non-radical) "death of God." The final stake for distance is its own
conceptual validity: either it misses itself in a misrecognition of the gap as a wasteland
of absence and is thus totally disabled by not reaching the Father in his invisibility, or it
constitutes itself through the recognition that only the saving withdrawal of the Father
can enable a son. Distance must surpass absence; or rather, it must arise from the very
radicalness of "believing without having seen" {John 20:29) that the paternal figure of
God is fundamentally presented by the absent one. Far from acting like a borderless pris-
on in which, to become lost, distance must lead the son to inhabit it like a fatherland,
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distance perpetually risks misrecognition just as difference undertakes to forget itself
without surrender. That the essence of the one consists in avoiding self-misrecognition,
and that of the other in a destiny devoted to forgetting, is what opposes difference and
distance more than their similarity; the relation of each to their invisibility determines
their entire coherence. Respect for the invisible determines the fate of difference as
much as that of distance.
The game they play is played in a similar fashion against all representation and against
all speech. Ontological difference can never become an object of representation. Indeed,
it could do so only if difference could be summed up as a relation which representa-
tional understanding could freely set into play and then could attribute amongst other
games to that of Being and beings. However, if difference were to be added in such a
fashion to a representable given, it would be added to a being, thus the difference of a
being. But what is the matter with this being? The being is that which is this matter;
that which is thus within it, Being, appears immediately as the Being of this being. The
difference works between Being and the being even before a representation of difference
or its definition by the understanding can intervene. Difference, "always already there,"
precedes its representation because no capacity for objectification, no capacity for rep-
resentation, no understanding is deployed except from the Being of a being resolved
with the being in its Being. 4 Bringing into play the wrinkle of the unfolding enfolding of
Being and beings, difference commands, from the outset, all thoughts which henceforth
will never stretch except to try to resolve or to resolve themselves to this resolution.
Difference establishes thought and it alone assures thought's opening into the Open.
Furthermore, just as it escapes representation so too does ontological difference ground
the thinking which will be thought in terms of representation. The circulation of this
coming before culminates in and as language. Language does not present ontological
difference as one of its possible statements. However, in every possible statement differ-
ence never ceases to express itself. Language never speaks except by following behind
difference, for only Resolution can open the space where speech can happen. Arising
out of difference, language never presents it. However, language effaces itself in order
to pronounce itself through and on difference. Distance also eludes all representation
since every representable object, like every representing subject, already depends most
definitely upon prior distance. Furthermore, in its paternal guise, distance by definition
evades any inquisition attempting to objectify it. Indeed, in the case of distance in its
paternal guise, it is precisely the inability to objectify the unthought which leads beyond
the negation of the thought, precisely the irrepresentable which outwits even the nega-
tion of representation. And in addition, language with its logia stems from distance
itself which, in dispensing language, brings it into accord with absolute praise. Unescap-
able yet unquestionable, language only speaks from within the distance which precedes
it and language forever makes concessions to distance and recedes from all the unfor-
mulated questions it will never grant. Language, here too, does not present distance
itself since language is presented in it and through it; it is received. Thus difference and
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distance, in a comparable way, play their respective games vis avis representation and
language. Resolution and hyphenated di-stance seem to give to distance the very traits
which ensure the indefinite definition of ontological difference. Must we, because of
this, fuse them and nullify the irreducible gap of distance in the encounter with onto-
logical difference?
Before concluding prematurely, we must return to the non-concordance we previ-
ously signalled: the main attribute of distance itself consists in not misrecognizing itself
while the split of ontological difference destines it to oblivion. In fact, ontological dif-
ference only resolves Being and beings first of all from Being as the Being of a being,
that is, by side-stepping from the outset the foremost and fundamental question of
Being as such, a question perhaps targetting the relation of Being to time and hence the
privileging of the present tense in ontological temporalisation:
If ontological difference which appears here is the gravest of dangers, it is so because
it always represents Being as a being within its metaphysical horizon; thus a question
about a being as a being, that is the metaphysical question, has a different orienta-
tion than the questions of Being as Being. This may be negatively expressed by saying
that the question of Being as Being is not the squaring away of the Being of a being
by raising it to the power of two. S
As much as anything else, ontological difference distinguishes Being from a being. How-
ever, this distinction does not question Being as Being. And difference never ceases to
forget Being as long as it insists upon proceeding to question Being from the perspective
of a being. Ontological difference organized according to its rootedness in its own for-
getting never ceases to produce metaphysics for it supplies the essence of metaphysics. It
must be noted that metaphysics certainly differs from ontological difference in that in
following the folds of the "folds" without thinking the following or the folds as such,
"Metaphysics would be, in its essence, the unthought secret because it is withheld by
Being itself;" metaphysics would remain in ontological difference by keeping it totally
"unthought." This very unthought casts the destiny of thinking upon its metaphysical
path:
Because metaphysical thinking always stays engaged with difference it is therefore
not thought as such; by virtue of the uniting unity of Resolution (Austrag) meta-
physics is, and is so in the modality of a unity, both ontological and theological.
By this very lapse the essence of metaphysics becomes this inability to think the
essence of difference. It is metaphysics or unthought difference because it is rerouted
for the exclusive benefit of a being whose present appearance hides the very appear-
ance and withdrawal of Being which governs it. 6
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Over and above this situation, if at some moment our thinking risks the undertaking of
a step outside the metaphysical and a step towards difference as such, if "our thinking
is free to wander past difference or to distinctly consider it as such," one should not
conclude on the other hand that the metaphysical has only failed by happenstance to
think difference because of some regretable contingency and that a good speculative
head could easily catch up to it:
The step backwards goes from the unrhought, from difference as such, towards
what must be thought - that is, towards the forgetting of difference. A forgetting
which here must be thought of as a veiling considered from the perspective of lethe
(occlusion), a veiling of difference as such, a veiling which, for its part, has been
abstracted from the very beginning (anfanglich). Forgetting belongs to difference
because the latter is linked to the former. Forgetting does not conceal difference
after the fact, as if due to some forgetful aspect of human thinking."?
What comes to be the stake in contemporary thinking is the non-metaphysical think-
ing of difference as such; however, the stake is a task and a test for this thinking, since
the passage from difference to metaphysics and to its unthought is not accidental but
arose out of a historial rigour whose constraining power we barely discern. Without a
doubt, ontological difference as such does not coincide with the onto-theological con-
stitution of metaphysics; as metaphysically unthought, difference feeds into the primacy
accorded to a being in the question of the Being of a being and thus ever so necessarily
leads to a privileging of the beingness of a being to the point of casting it into that most
perfect form, the being most filled with beingness, the supreme being. "When Being de-
ploys itself as the Being of a being, deploys itself as difference, as Resolution (Austrag),
it does so to the same extent that the mutual relation of the grounding and the ground-
ing in reason are and endure, so also does Being ground the being, and the being, as
being most superlatively being (das Seindste), grounds Being." "The ontological consti-
tution of metaphysics follows from the rule of difference which keeps Being as ground
and being as grounded as well as being as grounding-in-reason separate from but
related to each other."8 Difference, once it is deployed metaphysically in the very for-
getting of that which differs from it, creates and confirms the onto-theological constitu-
tion of metaphysics. Thus the more metaphysical thinking attempts to install itself in
the unthought of ontological difference, the more it constitutes and is constitued by
onto-theology. For as we have already seen, onto-theology pushes the question of the
Being of a being towards some supreme being; onto-theology pushes to the point that it
figures such a supreme being as some sort of causa sui. The idolatry of God is thus
achieved by metaphysical means. The unthought of ontological difference thus allows
for the elaboration of a conceptual idol of God that is representable, conceived from the
being which accuses Being, and as the supreme being, consecrating forgetfulness. The
workings of difference are subjected to the metaphysical rule of a supreme being and to
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its idolatrous representation. Distance attempts to break away from idols, even supreme
ones. Through its own forgetting, difference thus contributes to an onto-theological
constitution which distance seeks to revoke in the name of the unthought Absolute.
Even if yet-to-be-thought difference and unthought difference seem to proceed along
parallel paths, in their instantiations they remain radically opposed for two very pro-
found reasons: first, one allows the idol of a causa sui to be affirmed whereas the other,
in light of Necessity (aitia), ceaselessly disqualifies such a possibility. The second and
most basic reason is that another opposition grounds this opposition: difference thinks
"God" beginning from the question of Being (it matters little if it does so in metaphysi-
calor non-metaphysical terms) whereas distance dares to step back from the question
of Being and claims to think the unthought in a more abandoned and thus more origi-
nal fashion. If this claim cannot be justified, could it, at the very least, be formulated?
However, here we must still face ontological difference and the course of Heidegger's
thinking. In a piece dating from the same period as Sein und Zeit (1927), Heidegger
demonstrates how the analytic of Dasein precedes and determines the conditions of
the being which affects the Christian event - "Christianity." In a word, the analytic of
Dasein ontologically indicates a pre-Christian content and given for which "Chris-
tianity" is only the mark of an ontic corrective. If theology's rigour is measured by the
robustness of the ontic corrective that it imposes upon the beings it concerns itself with,
then such a measurement will in turn be defined according to the gap between the ontic
corrective and the ontological analytic of Dasein. Also, since "Christianity" never inter-
venes except to provide ontic variation, it is Dasein that constitutes the ontological in-
variant. "Christianity" becomes the ontic variable of an ontological invariant, Dasein.
Theology formulates this variable and gauges its gaps just as philosophy devotes itself
to the analytics of the invariant and identifies its possible avatars.9
Beyond the opposition of "Christianity" and theology, what seems decisive for
the basic case of the question of God is stated here once and for all: God will never
be able to appear in the field of the inquiry except under the mediating instances of
"Christianity," first of all, and then of Dasein. Without a doubt, this means that
God only plays in an ontic fashion (here according to an "ontic corrective") upon the
ground of a Dasein which Sein und Zeit immediately shows is the only approach to
the question of Being: the supreme being of onto-theological metaphysics only finds
its hermeneutic (ontological) location in the primacy of Dasein, meaning only where
Dasein exists. The question of God is thus from the outset severed from the "God" of
onto-theology, but also from any being that does not exist in the modality of Dasein.
This means that any possible God, including one outside of onto-theology, is approached
only through Dasein according to the allotment of certain roles: God, a being, Dasein,
the hermeneutical being of Being; God regresses to the rank of supreme being, that is, a
being in a very restricted sense, for its beingness as being is not that of Being. Theology
is thus encamped upon an ontic variable: first, submission of God to Being; second, this
means that God is only a being among all those that the Being of being resolves accord-
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ing to ontological difference. God is but "God;" if he is now only invoked as a supreme
being, it is so as to appear as the smallest of beings all the more; "God," bound by this
second condition, is entirely subjected to a preset idolatry which by means of lengthily
analysed and precisely catagorized intermediaries deduces him from Being (that is,
Dasein which preserves him) just as a being among others. Indeed, a deduction-
almost in the Kantian sense of the word - rigourously links Being (and therefore Dasein)
with "God." What seems remarkable is the insistence and persistence of passages that
declare such a reduction:
thinking which begins to think from the question of the truth of Being is a thinking
that inquires closer to the origin than can any metaphysical thinking. It is only by
beginning with the truth of Being that the essence of the sacred is able to be
thought. It is only from the essence of the sacred that the essence of the divine can
be thought. It is only through the light of the essence of the divine that that which is
designated under the rubric God can be named and thought. Must we not be able to
understand with care and to listen to all these words if we wish as men, that is as
beings, to be able to experience a God-man relation?lo
A sequence rigourously links, as conditions which bind themselves, God to the divine,
the divine to the sacred, the sacred (das Heilige) to the whole (das Heil: the healed).
"What is no longer whole as such puts us on to the track of the whole. The whole is a
signal beckoning towards the sacred. The sacred religiously binds the divine. The divine
brings God near." Before the question of the "death of God," there was the question of
the metaphysical figure (onto-theology) that made that death possible; likewise, the
question of a "return of the gods" or of a "new god" must give way to a more essential
interrogation. "Where must he (God) turn when he returns if a place is not prepared for
him by men beforehand (zuvor)? And how could a place be found adequate for God if a
ray of divinity had not already (zuvor) begun to glimmer in all that exists?" The lacking
God in effect points towards an extinction of the divine. "Not only have the gods and
the divine deserted us but in the history of the world the spark of divinity has been
extinguished."ll The deduction claims to deepen the question of God by dealing with
divinity in general; the question of divinity only has currency as a question of wholeness
(das Heile) which itself is not received safe and sound except through the protection
assured by the Open; in turn, the Open - following a modality that expressly ignores
ontological difference and its resolution - fuses earth, sky, mortals, and the divine only
according to the expansive glow of Being. What the lecture What is a Thing? calls the
Geviert, the Fourfold, would not include the divine in the entities it dispenses if God
was not first of all summed up by the divine and if the divine was not to be fully under-
stood as a being, "for God himself, if he exists, is a being, holds a position as a being in
Being, in the essence of this one who comes to be according to the worlding of the the
world."12 God must be understood to be a being and his coming (which is popularly
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and metaphysically called his "existence") depends upon the possibilities maintained by
the world, and thus to offer a place - the Open - where the coming of such and such a
being remains possible. Perhaps God created the world "ontically" but, without a
doubt, it is the world as a living world which manages the Open that ontologically
creates every aspect of the coming of God in the divine through the sacred according to
the consent of the whole. The case here is no longer that of the idolatrous "God" of
onto-theology. However, there may perhaps still be an idol here. That an idol is only
beginning to show itself does not mitigate the idolatry. "God" exists according to the
modality of a being. One can state in advance (zuvor) that "God" exists in the manner
of a being and thus nothing could be said about him that would be an exception to the
Being of being. Whether the latter is understood metaphysically or non-metaphysically
does little to change the fundamental premise. Just as onto-theology produces an idol of
"God" as causa sui, the thought of a "new beginning" will only greet "God" to the
extent that it can create for him a "divine place" (Aufenhalt according to the com-
mentary on the Heraclitan ethos in the Letter on Humanism). The gap between a meta-
physical and a non-metaphysical thought of the divine matters less than their total
agreement in idolatry in thinking of God as a divine being which yields the divine dig-
nity of Being: always appears more fundamentally in "God" than as "God," and Being
thus attests to God's being a being among others. "God" becomes the shining idol
wherein Being spares us its divinity in the Fourfold.
This "God" is still an idol, the highest and most difficult to produce, the most glori-
ous and most salutory for human Dasein. Without a doubt, its advent would joyously
startle Dasein. However, it is still an idol. Before it makes its appearance, must we
escape from it by risking an extreme conclusion: is not God a being that Being precedes,
governs and doles out? Perhaps it is indeed necessary to be as blunt as possible while
positing that Being and God are not one and that idolatry lurks in even the greatest
thinkers (Heidegger but Thomas Aquinas as welP3) when they come close to confusing
the two. Perhaps we must renounce thinking about God from the perspective of Being
not only when onto-theology concludes that "God is dead" and leaves no other choice
for the believer, but also and all the more so when a "new beginning"14 leads to an
overpopulation of "new gods" (Nietzsche) or a new "place" for the divine. Perhaps we
must, with Dionysius the Areopagite, sustain our discourse with the very circularity of
its reference and seriously listen to what the praise of distance offers to our thinking:
that Being (but let us also note the One, or the Good, or Truth) does not offer an essen-
tial name for God and thus God only becomes thinkable once the unthought is admit-
ted as the place, condition and measure of the Absolute. Finally, perhaps only a way of
thinking that works without postulates, not even those of respecting the conditions it
could establish for the operation of its own logic, would vaguely begin to appropriate
the meaning of what it means to say: God. There's more. What about a "God" consid-
ered as a being? Heidegger says that theology considers the "way" in which "Christi-
anity" sublates (aufheben) human being and pre-Christian terms. 15 No doubt. Still,
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"Christianity" not only transforms the way of human being; or rather, this transforma-
tion operates first of all, before the disciple, through Christ himself, which is no small
matter. As if referring to a coherent set of equivalencies, we can, of course, speak about
"the divine among the Greeks, the Jewish prophets, and in the teaching of Jesus." 16 But
it might be preferable to understand such equivalencies as Holderlin understood the fra-
ternal relation of Christ to Hercules and Dionysius as a cumulative, paradoxical and
inaugural heritage (and no doubt, this is how Heidegger understood it), in which case,
if the divine takes the aspect of Christ, the man-god, the "way" he affects human beings
has a good chance of taking up the solemn infinity of the Incarnation: if God invested
humans with all his grandness, gave himself without reserve from the depths of distance
to human being - it is not only human "ways" that God assumes but humanity itself; it
is not the ontic "way" of such and such a being but the basic constitution of Dasein
which he embraces and refurbishes. Kenosis coincides here perfectly with recapitula-
tion: in giving himself up to humanity and sacrificing to it all the signs of divinity, God
masterfully and fundamentally takes possession of humanity as his due. If this is the
case, we must ask two questions. First, is Christ, through the masterly recapitulative
kenosis, content with an ontic and ontically thinkable event which modifies, post hoc,
certain ontic determinations of Dasein ("content") without wholly affecting its intimate
constitution? Or does he, through an original and terminal coming, attempt to garner
not only for a specific being (his own humanity) but also for the Being of a being an
entirely new dimension? Without going into the details of this "new dimension" and its
significance, nor even deciding if this first question must be answered, let us ask two
further questions. First, does the Incarnation and Resurrection of Christ affect ontolog-
ical destiny or do they remain purely ontic events? Second, an objection to the ontolog-
ical independence of God follows from the undeniable priorness of the "divine place"
which would welcome him; but how precisely does God depend upon the place (accord-
ing to such and such a figure of world history) humanity manages for him? In fact, an
idol depends entirely upon this premise since the idol reflects it, gives it a name and
finds a visual aspect in it. But Jewish pronouncements and Christian revelation both
mobilize, on the grounds of a critique of idolatry which modern thought has not out-
grown, an advent of God which is witnessed even though "his own received him not"
(John 1:11). Far from limiting or forbidding manifestation, the fault of the "divine
place" becomes its condition (as the destruction of all idols before the unthought) it's
characteristic (God alone can reveal himself where and when no other divine being can
stay) and even its highest stake (God reveals himself by shedding divine glory). God
who manifests himself as Jesus Christ does not depend on any "divine place" precisely
because He casts off divinity as it is conceived by humans. Be it on the cross or in his
state of being a Nazarene, what "divine place" was offered so that God could be suit-
ably (that is divinely) received? None, and God was not suitably received. But does God
want our suitable reception and does he make it a precondition of his advent? Should
we not learn from God what suitability means according to the Evangelist's meaning
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when he says: "ought not Christ to have suffered these things, and to enter into his
glory" (Luke 24:26)? Who can and who has the right to make decisions about the divine
and the suitability of the divine, God or Dasein? Kenosis, misrecognition, and rejection
repudiate the condition of a "divine place"; furthermore, they contribute to the erection
of a figure of revelation as a paradox wherein humiliation and misunderstanding become
the setting and the theatre of the agape (Spirit), of the Father for the Son and of the Son
for the Father. The condition for the revelation of the Father in the figure of the Son, or
rather, its investment and return, rely precisely upon the breakdown and collapse of any
and all "divine places": in the darkening of the sky with no hint of the blue halo that
accompanies even the most minor of Greek gods, Christ dies, and trinitarian distance is
revealed in this darkness. This is why the figure of revelation is equally displayed as a
figure of dissimulation and thus of judgement (John, Pascal, etc.), for it appears and is
received even when the most elementary conditions ("existential dimension," "existen-
tial concept") - "divine place" - fail. Kenosis imposes no conditions upon its revelation
because through this revelation it gives itself and reveals nothing but this unconditional
giving. Our lack of respect, in a word our "unsuitability," even if it is based on an onto-
logical destiny, cannot impose conditions on this giving without preconditions. For the
mystery resides in this: God loves those who do not love him; God manifests himself to
those that turn away from him, all the more, the more they turn away.
These two observations show that God takes his distance from the idols proposed by
ontological difference and also, perhaps more simply, those proposed by Being. God
withdraws in distance, in the unthought, and the undetermined and thus moves infinitely
closer. Distance distances itself from ontological difference and Being which, among
others, it governs. Distance itself is thus not formalizable from the perspective of differ-
ence. Can we hope, for that matter, to formalize distance through a critique of an onto-
logical difference which still remains idolatrous? We believed so, and we tried it.
Translated by Fran\=oise Lachance
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